Throwing Like a Girl: Femininity, Body Comportment and Self-Objectification

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In Iris Young’s piece, Throwing Like a Girl, she rejects the idea that differences in body comportment and spatiality between the sexes are the result of inherent biological characteristics or a “feminine essence” with which women are born. While men and women have differences when it comes to movement and use of the body, she brings up that we cannot examine such differences in a void. The situation must be examined and the social, cultural, historical and economic forces that act upon men and women must be considered when seeking to explain why someone may “throw like a girl”.

            As Young describes it, drawing from previous works such as that of De Beauvoir, women feel limited in the use of their bodies and the space around them. They feel timid and tend to trust their bodies less than their male counterparts do. This comes as the result of situational forces rather than biology, as women are not given the same opportunities and encouragement to use their bodies as men are, and they are also conditioned by society to carry themselves in a particular “feminine” manner. As Young puts it, “the more a girl assumes her status as feminine, the more she takes herself to be fragile and immobile, and the more she enacts her own body inhibition” (153). This idea of the fragility of the female body and the inhibition of that body comes from the fact that women are taught that they are defined by their bodies. They are given the message that their bodies are ornaments to be gazed upon, rather than subject that may act as they please. 

One point that Young briefly touches upon, which I found to be immensely interesting, is that women themselves may pick up the idea of the female body as a mere object. While others may be the source of the attitude, the woman herself may help perpetuate it. I did further research into this idea, and found an interesting article concerning how this “self-objectification” exists in and can affect the lives of women.  

It has been found that self-objectification can lead to increased opportunities for negative emotions such as shame, disgust and anxiety (Gettman, 2004). These increased negative emotions could likely feed back into increased femininity, as someone who is anxious about and ashamed of their body and is more easily disgusted by dirt and the production of sweat is not likely to engage with more stereotypically masculine activities, such as sports. All of these emotions encourage women to see their bodies as enemies, or as an unruly thing that needs to be policed and brought into line with cultural expectations. This viewpoint is unlikely to lead to feelings of trust in the body’s abilities and feed the idea of women as fragile and pristine.     

Self-objectification has also been found to be extremely easy to activate and reinforce. Everyday things, such as exposure to media images of thin women, can lead to increases in self-objectification and the associated negative feelings (Gettman, 2004). Even the most subtle priming, such as hearing or reading words like “elegant”, “figure” or “posing” was enough to cause activation of self-objectification (Gettman, 2004). Basically, any reminder of the body or physical attractiveness was enough to cause women to be concerned about and judge their own bodies. Women have come to associate themselves with physical attractiveness, and are extremely concerned with how they as objects may be viewed by other people. Women see their bodies as things to be evaluated by other people, rather than as part of themselves as subjects, the source of abilities, skills, and strength.             

The fact that women do not connect their bodies with physical attractiveness rather than physical competence or abilities was also shown in the Gettman study. While women responded to words like “weight” and “appearance” with anxiety, connecting those ideas with their bodies, they did not respond to words like “strong”, “vitality” or “energetic” (Gettman, 2004). These results, that women did not respond to terms linked with body competence, shows that women either do not connect those ideas with their bodies at all or they are not concerned that their bodies are not perceived in those terms. The fact that women worry about the perception of their bodies as physically attractive but do not respond with similar concerns about their bodies as physically competent shows just how engrained cultural messages about women’s bodies truly are. Women are taught that their bodies, particularly the appearance of their bodies, are what define them, to the point that the mere suggestion of attractiveness provokes anxiety about living up to cultural standards. There is no such reaction for being reminded of physical skill or athleticism.             

 The culture that surrounds women is one that teaches them to consider their bodies as objects. These objects are to be groomed, polished and ornamented so as to be beautiful and desirable. This objectification distances women not only from other people, but from their own bodies. When the body is regarded as simply a thing and objectified, it is hard to feel a connection to it. As Young describes it, a woman “cannot be in unity with herself, but must take a distance from and exist in discontinuity with her body” (154). This distancing keeps women from moving openly, and contributes to the differences in body comportment between men and women. If women were taught that their bodies were powerful, were capable, and that physical exertion was a possible and positive activity for them, I think we would see a much stronger connection between women and their bodies. I would even say that that the phenomenon of “throwing like a girl” would likely no longer exist.

References

Gettman, J.Y., & Roberts, T. (2004). Mere exposure: Gender differences in the negative effects of priming a state of self-objectification. Sex Roles, 51(1-2), 17-27
Young, I.M. (1980). Throwing like a girl: A phenomenology of feminine body comportment motility and spatiality. Human Studies, 3(1), 137-156

Anti-Inclusion Feminism: What Are They Afraid Of?

In Gender Outlaw, Kate Bornstein discusses the attacks made on transgender and transsexual individuals by some cultural feminists (Bornstein 75-77). She chooses to title this section with a question, one that I believe gets to the heart of the issue-What are they afraid of? (Bornstein 74) 

            Bornstein’s main example of the anti-inclusionary feminist is Janice G. Raymond, and she discusses two primary fears present in Raymond’s work. The first is a fear of a loss of power, specifically the invasion of “women only” spaces by someone who was not born a female, who may then seek to assume a position of power and control (Bornstein 76). Bornstein makes the point that such fears are not historically without precedent, and brings up the example of the nadle (Bornstein 75). The nadle comes from the Navajo culture, and was a male-to-female transgender person whose social role was to suppress uprisings of women (Bornstein 75). The fear that Raymond has of transgender and transsexual people becoming a part of feminism seems to be a fear that they will become a modern day equivalent of the nadle. Second is the fear of deception, which she presents as a form of rape (Bornstein 76). This again echoes the fear of the nadle and that hiding one’s transgender or transsexual status may be used in order to gain power. Bornstein to an extent seems to agree with this point, describing it as “an unworthy stance, more heinous if one’s invisible status is maintained with the purpose of gaining power” (Bornstein 76).

            While these fears give a basic understanding of the fears of anti-inclusion feminism, the issue goes far deeper than Bornstein can explore in a few short paragraphs. These issues are described and rebutted in Eli R. Green’s Debating Trans Inclusion in the Feminist Movement (http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/J155v10n01_12). In this article Green pays special attention to the works of Janice Raymond and their impact on modern day feminism. 

            In Green’s article, a clearer picture of Raymond’s view of trans individuals is presented to the reader. She assumed that “woman-ness” could only come from being born female, and did not believe that it could exist in a male body (Green 236-237). I believe that it is this thinking that drove many of her fears, as she assumed that if they were allowed into “women only” spaces, it would represent an intrusion of maleness and an extension of the patriarchy into the female sphere. She could not accept them as women, and instead saw them as a sort of wolf in sheep’s clothing.

            She also saw trans individuals as diametrically opposed to the idea of feminism. Drawing on the statistic that, at the time, a majority of transsexual surgeries were male-to-female, she concluded that trans men were incredibly rare, and an anomaly (Green 237). She explained this by saying that feminism inhibits the existence of trans men, and that feminists will not identify as trans men as the result of being feminists (Green 237). Specifically, she thought that trans men were simply women seeking to avoid the oppression associated with being women, which can be equally fulfilled by feminism (Green 238). She took this logical fallacy and turned it around, saying that trans people cannot be feminists because they are trans. Overall, her view of trans women was, as Green puts it, of “deviant men on a mission to destroy or at least usurp the success of the feminist movement” (239).

            While I find these claims patently ridiculous, there still exists today a branch of feminism which continues to hold on to Raymond’s fears. The message may have changed somewhat since 1979, but the fear that trans people are not feminist enough, and may be dangerous to the feminism as a result, is still present (Green 240). However, these views are, in my opinion, extremely damaging to feminism as a whole. 

By refusing to consider trans people as a legitimate part of the feminist movement and by delegitimizing their identities, feminism is pushing away allies and becoming oppressive in and of itself. Why is it better to simply push these people away than to open a dialogue and determine how to incorporate their struggles and experiences into the feminist movement? As Green points out in the concluding comments of the article, feminism has hardly been static throughout the history of the movement (Green 246). It has made changes and will continue to make them. Why then, is it so infeasible to change to accommodate trans individuals?

I believe that the heart of anti-inclusion feminism is fear, based on a lack of understanding and a historical precedent of misinformation. The key to reducing this fear, and thus reducing the pushback against trans people being a part of feminism, is communication. Hopefully a meaningful dialogue can finally put to rest the false fears of Janice Raymond, of the wolf sheep’s clothing trans woman whose very existence is diametrically opposed to feminism. Instead, they can be seen as the women that they are, as people who are not defined by their genitals, and who may have experienced and evaluated the system in ways that traditional feminism may not have thought of before. And in the end I believe that this will make feminism stronger.

Bornstein, K. (1994). Gender outlaw: On men, women and the rest of us. London: Routledge

Green, E. R. (2006). Debating trans inclusion in the feminist movement. Journal of Lesbian Studies, 10(1-2), 231-248.

Portrayals and Dehumanization of Intersex Bodies

Early treatment of intersex individuals was intrusive and dehumanizing, and they were treated as though their bodies were the result of some pathology. These conditions are extensively described in Elizabeth Reis’ Bodies in Doubt. Some of the most striking examples come from the very beginning of America’s history. In colonial times intersex individuals who were brought before the courts were subject to extensive inspection, and were made to expose their genitals to the scrutiny of several strangers (Reis 9-11). It is easy upon reading the descriptions of the abysmal treatment of these people to assume that it was simply the result of a less progressive era, that our understanding and treatment of intersex bodies today must be radically different. 

However, in the course of my research I ran across a startling article, Jarring Bodies: Thoughts on the Display of Unusual Anatomies (http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pbm/summary/v043/43.2dreger.html). Upon reading it, I was startled to find that we have not come nearly as far as I had hoped or imagined. The medical community has progressed by leaps and bounds in many ways since the days of colonial America. However, their treatment of intersex individuals is in many ways stuck in the 18^th century.

In Dreger’s article she discusses the dehumanization that intersex individuals in the modern era experience when dealing with the medical community. People with unusual bodies are “repeatedly subjected to physical and visual examinations by medical students, residents, and attending physicians” (Dreger 162), which leaves them feeling “like insects tacked to a board for study” (Dreger 162). This is not exactly a far cry from the treatment of intersex individuals in the 1600s.

A point that is raised in both Reis and Dreger’s works is the difference between illustrations of intersex individuals in the 19^th century as compared to other eras. In the case shown in Reis’ book, the subject is portrayed, somewhat confusingly, as elegantly posed and having a physique similar to that of a Greek god or goddess, even though the actual subject was only known to the artist as a poverty-stricken corpse (Reis 43). In a case described by Dreger, the subject is depicted on stage, wearing a theatrical, turban-like hat (Dreger 165). However, despite the inaccuracies and dramatized nature of these illustrations, they appeared as distinct people, with faces and bodies included. Whether this is more or less respectful to the subjects themselves is up for debate, but it is clear that the depictions of intersex bodies at that time presented the subjects as full people, rather than just parts.

It is this portrayal and treatment of intersex individuals as people, rather than just genitals, that is lacking in the modern era. Dreger points out in her article, that intersex individuals are rarely provided with any sort of compensation for the distress they endure while being photographed, studied or otherwise have the most private parts of their body scrutinized (Dreger 169). Instead, it is assumed that the compensation for them is that they are contributing to the wealth of knowledge of intersex bodies. Not with the purpose of simply understanding them in general of course, but to better understand how to “fix” or “normalize” them. As Dreger puts it, they are told that “we get to see you, examine you, and display you at will, because we’re trying hard to fix and prevent people like you” (169). 

In order reverse the dehumanization of intersex bodies, we must move away from the idea that these people are no more than their parts. We need to move away from the idea that intersex bodies are pathological, and recognize that they are part of the normal spectrum of human morphology. One way that we can do this is to present intersex bodies as human bodies, rather than just limiting them to pictures of genitals on the pages of a medical textbook. Intersex people should be presented as they see themselves, as people, not just in the way that the medical field sees them.

As part of her introduction, Reis explains and, to an extent defends, her use of illustrations throughout her book (Reis xvii). She recognizes the harm and discomfort that has been associated with this reduction of individuals to their parts, and yet she includes them in order to teach and explain. I think that this is the type of consideration that needs to be applied broadly to the treatment of images of intersex individuals. It is not wrong to seek to learn more about these types of bodies, but we must consider how the images contribute to and reflect society’s attitude towards intersex individuals.

Dreger, A. (2000). Jarring bodies: Thoughts on the display of unusual anatomies. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 43(2), 161-172.

Reis, E. (2009). Bodies in doubt: An american history of intersex. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.